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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FLORENCE GILLMOR, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent,) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 16221 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a suit for a declaratory judgment seeking a 
determination regarding three written leases, (a) as to the termi-
nation date and (b) as to whether they are subject to renewal. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The court made and entered a sunnnary judgment dated 
July 25, 1978, declaring that two leases covering land in Tooele 
County and Sunnnit County terminated on December 31, 1978, without 
right of renewal, which judgment was appealed to this Court, No. 
16023, and on November 24, 1978, the Court made and entered an 
"Order and Judgment", after trial, declaring the two leases men-
tioned above and a third lease covering land in Salt Lake County 
shall terminate on December 31, 1978, with no right of renewal. 
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"20-426 - Florence J. Gillmor 
The Southwest \ of the Southwest \ of 
Section 32, Township 2 North, Range 1 
West, SLM, cont. 40 acres. 
"20-359 - Edward L. Gillmor 
The Southeast \ of the Northwest \ of 
Section 18, Township 1 North, Range 2 
West, SLM, cont. 40 acres." 
It will be further noted that at the bottom of ~f 
are the signatures of Edward L. Gillmor and Florence J. Gill: 
followed by the word, "Lessors". 
Each lease contains the following provision re~~ 
to renewal, the meaning of which is in controversy in this c• 
"THE LESSEES have the option to extend this h 
for a period of two years upon the expiration of r: 
lease, provided the ownership of this property is 
vested in the present Lessor." 
The record in this case discloses that the interes: 
the lessee, Stephen T. Gillmor, was assigned to the defendan: 
(R. 179). Also, that Edward L. Gillmor was the owner of an: 
divided one-half interest in all of the land described in th1 
Lake County lease (R. 263) . The defendant succeeded to his: 
in all of the land described in the lease by his will (R. 10 
264, 265) . 
At the opening of the trial of this case, on Novei 
1978, counsel for the plaintiff stated that the trial concer 
only the lease on the Salt Lake County property. The plaint: 
put in evidence the lease on the Salt Lake County property,· 
(R. 258), and also the Sunnnit and Tooele County leases (R. l: 
after they were identified. Florence testified that she owr.: 
-4-
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only the 40-acre tract described on page 6 of the lease and her 
father owned the rest and that she succeeded to her father's 
interest (R. 263). She also testified that her father died in 
1970. 
The defendant testified that in addition to the leases 
from his uncle, Edward L. Gillmor, he had written leases in the 
same form from his brother, Charles F. Gillmor, Jr., covering his 
one-fourth interest in the same land in all three counties. See 
Exhibits 4-D, 5-D, and 6-D. The defendant also testified that he 
owned a one-fourth interest in the land described in all of the 
leases (R.276). 
An effort was made by the defendant to show the surround-
ing circumstances at the time of the execution of the leases. Ob-
jection was made by the plaintiff on the ground that the language 
in the lease regarding the right to renew is clear and unambiguous 
(R. 275). The objection was sustained (R. 278, 289). 
The trial court made findings of fact that the renewal 
language in the each of the three leases that the words "present 
Lessor" referred only to Edward Lincoln Gillmor and that the plain-
tiff, Florence Gillmor, is not a "present Lessor''; that Edward 
Lincoln Gillmor died in 1970 and that the court " .... independantly 
concurs .... " in the summary judgment dated July 5, 1978 (R. 177-181). 
The court then entered a judgment, dated November 24, 1978, declar-
ing that all three leases "shall terminate on December 31, 1978, 
and that the defendant has no right to renew any of the leases. 
(R. 182, 183) 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This appeal is taken from the judgment dated Nove!Dl 
24, 1978. 
ARGUMENT 
As stated above, this case and Case No. 16023 have 
consolidated for the purposes of Appeal and the brief in No. 
was filed on November 16, 1978. In that brief, the followin1 
points were argued which are pertinent to this case: 
"II A covenant to renew a lease runs with t 
land 
"III There are genuine issues of material f1 
"IV The complications of co tenancy should t. 
been considered by the Court 
"V Options to renew a lease are construed: 
strongly against the Lessor" 
The arguments under the points indicated are adopt< 
incorporated in this brief. The additional points directed: 
errors of the trial court in the trial of the case and in cot 
ing the Salt Lake County lease are discussed below. 
I 
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF 
SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The plaintiff's counsel throughout the trial took t 
position that the Salt Lake County lease was clear and unambi 
ous. We: quote: 
"Q. Do you remember whether the 1957 lease wa 
a lease and an option to purchase or simply a leas< 
-6-
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. . "MR. LEE; ~our Honor, I'm going to object to 
this line of questioning. He has answered he made a 
dil~gent.search. He hasn't been able to find it. I 
don t think anybody among the parties has been able to 
find it. But I do not know how that relates to the '69 
lease ~ich we cla~m is clear and unambiguous. I believe 
any evidence relating to the--what the intention of the 
parties was with respect to that language is not admissi-
ble in evidence as long as it's clear and unambiguous." 
See also arguments of counsel to the same effect, pp. 
256, 275, 277, 278. 
As indicated above, the Salt Lake County lease, Exhibit 
1-P, was signed by two persons, Edward L. Gillmor and the plaintiff 
above th.e word "Lessors''. On page 1 of the lease, Edward L. Gillmor 
is referred to as "Lessor" in the singular. The question in this 
case is whether in view of the fact that the plaintiff was actually 
named as one of the "Lessors" and the further fact that the one-
half interest of h.er father, Edward L. Gillmor, had passed to her 
as the sole heir in 1970 and was owned by her at the time of the 
filing of this suit, made her a "Lessor" within the meaning of the 
renewal clause. 
It will be noted that the proviso in the renewal clause 
states, " .... provided the ownership of this property is vested in 
the present Lessor .... ". It does not say at what date the owner-
ship is to be vested in the Lessor, nor does it say whether the 
word "Lessor" means both Lessors, Edward L. Gillmor and Florence 
J. Gillmor, or means only Edward L. Gillmor, who, according to 
plaintiff's counsel, was 92 or 93 years old in 1969 when the lease 
was made. (R. 296) See also deposition of Edward L. Gillmor, P· 26. 
-7-
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This is certainly an ambiguity within the meaning c 
the rule as to whether the plaintiff was a "Lessor", which?< 
mits the introduction of evidence as to surrounding circumsta 
The rule regarding the admission of evidence to she 
the surrounding circumstances is well stated in Continental 1 
and Trust Co., v. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 p. 2d 890 as fo. 
"In view of the lack of definiteness in the 
terms of the contract, it was proper for the court· 
receive extraneous evidence as to its meaning. It. 
true that the express terms of an agreement may not 
be abrogated, nullified or modified by parol testk: 
but where, because of vagueness or uncertainty int 
language used, the intent of the parties is in ques 
the court may consider the situation of the parties 
facts and circumstances surrounding the making oft 
contract, the purpose of its execution, and the re· 
spective claims thereunder, to ascertain what the 
parties intended." 
It must have been within the contemplation of the; 
that a renewal clause would be meaningless and surplusage if. 
would become effective only if the Lessor lived to be 102 or 
years old. 
Another ambiguity is pointed out in the plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. )] 
at p. 77) under the heading, 
"Defendant is Not Entitled to Extend the Subj< 
Leases for the Independent Reason that the Covenant 
Extend did Not Run with the Land, but was Personal 
Edward Lincoln Gillmor". 
Was the intention of the parties to have the lease 
tinue for another two years to preserve the family livestock 
• 'i business by making the renewal provision a covenant running· 
the land? We think this is an ambiguity. 
-8-
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Another ambiguity is whether upon reading the provision 
relating to the sale of the property on pages 6 and 7 of the lease 
with the option to renew provision, it was the intention of the 
parties that the limitation of the renewal provision would take 
effect only if the land is sold. 
The defendant was denied the right to go into surround-
ing circumstances when the court sustained a preliminary question 
was to the livestock business upon the often repeated argument by 
counsel for the plaintiff that the meaning of the lease was "clear 
and unambiguous" and that no evidence of surrounding circumstances _ 
was admissible. (R. 277) 
In his opening statement to the court, counsel for the 
plaintiff said: 
"There will not be any evidence as to the 
intentions of the parties because we think it is 
clear and unambiguous". 
We think the record is clear that the trial court adopted 
the theory of the plaintiff, held as a matter of law that there was 
no ambiguity and based its judgment thereon. The defendant was denied 
the right to show surrounding circumstances. This was error. 
II 
THE CASE WAS PREMATURELY FILED 
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EXISTING CONTROVERSY 
AND ONGOING ACTIVITIES OF THE PARTIES 
MIGHT HAVE CHANGED THE FACTUAL SITUATION 
Certain restrictions on the declaratory judgment proceed-
ings which are applicable here were well summarized in the case 
-9-
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of Norvell v. Sangre de Cris to Development Co. , USCA 10th Ci: 
519 F. 2d 370. We quote from page 378: 
the time 
31, 1978, 
" ... This court has consistently held, however 
that the test for determining an actual contr~vers·: 
via declaratory judgment proceedings is whether · 
there is a controvers between the arties havfn 
a verse e a interests o su ficient imme iac an; 
rea it to warrant issuance o ec arator u en: 
United States v. Fisher-Otis Company, Inc., 9 F.: 
1146 (10th Circ. 1974); Duggins v. Hunt, 323 F.2d; 
(10th Cir. 1963). 
"We cannot render advisory opinions on unknowr. 
facts. Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc., 
v. United States, 404 F.2d 1066 (10th Cir. 1968); 
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma v. Dulick, supra. 
"Finally, we hold that declaratory judgments a 
improper when, as here, ongoing ac ti vi ty may radica 
change the factual situation. In Mechlin~ Bar'e Li 
v. United States, 368 U.S. 324, 82 S.Ct. 37, L.[ 
317 (1961), the Supreme Court, in holding that deci 
tory judgment is a remedy committed to judicial di; 
tion, held, inter alia: 
In 
'We think that sound discretion withholds 
the remedy where it appears that a challenged 
"continuing practice" is, at the moment adjud: 
tion is sought, undergoing significant modific 
tion so that its ultimate form cannot be con· 
fidently predicted.' 
368 U.S. 324 at 331, 82 S.Ct. 337 at 341. Ill 
this case, if, under the proviso in the renewal 
when ownership was to be vested in the lessor was Di 
(the end of the ten year lease) there could be an: 
controversy develop in only one of two ways, (1) the termina' 
of the lease or (2) the filing of a document with the lessor 
cising the option and rejection by the lessor. The record si 
nothing which would create an actual controversy. 
-10-
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With respect to the ongoing activities which might have 
changed the factual situation at the end of the term, there is 
attached to the complaint voluminous records in the pending 
partition suit between the parties. This was an ongoing activity 
which might well have changed the applicable facts as to the 
renewal of the lease. 
CONCLUSION 
The court erred in holding as a matter of law that the 
plaintiff was not a lessor on the Salt Lake County lease. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E.~ SKEEN D SKEEN 
536 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, to James B. Lee and 
Kathleen W. Lowe, of and for Parsons, Behle & Latimer, 79 South 
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent, this 16th day of March, 1979. 
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